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Certainly free speech may in some instances be abridged law-
fully through the valid use of the loyalty oath. At the same time,
however, it is evident that particular attention will be paid to the
nature of the area wherein its use is sought. The present decision
impliedly indicates a growing tendency on the part of the court to
look askance at indiscriminate usage of the oath, particularly in
view of its manifest curtailment of free speech. It reveals that the
myth entertained by a few courts that tax benefits (and conceiv-
ably unemployment benefits, public housing, etc.) are merely in
the nature of a governmental bounty, to be bestowed or withheld
at will, is untenable. The Supreme Court refuses to overlook the
fact that withholding "bounties" because of alleged disloyalty, as
evidenced solely by a refusal to make a loyalty declaration, cir-
cumscribes free speech while accomplishing little towards the
actual protection of a government from subversion.
MAURICE GARVEY
Federal Criminal Procedure: Habeas Corpus - Disposition of
Petitioner in State Custody after Finding Illegal Detention-Peti-
tioner was convicted in a state trial court in 1948 of armed robbery
and sentenced to an indeterminate period with life as the minimum and
maximum duration of imprisonment. Immediately after the trial a
notice of appeal was filed and a verbatim record of the evidence and
proceedings requested. Before the official court reporter had transcribed
his notes from shorthand he suffered a physical breakdown and was
incapacitated from doing any further work. During this illness the
shorthand notes were lost or destroyed. During the following ten years
the petitioner prosecuted numerous appeals in order to obtain a re-
view of his conviction, including three petitions to the United States
Supreme Court for writs of certiorari, all of which failed. In 1958,
on petition to the United States District Court for a writ of habeas
corpus, the court ordered the writ to issue and after a full hearing
the denial of an application for unemployment compensation for refusal to
take a loyalty oath. Rudder v. United States, 105 A.2d 741 (Mun. Ct. App.
D.C. 1954), upholding the right to evict petitioner for refusal to subscribe a
loyalty oath. Reversed in 226 F. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) without deciding the
actual constitutionality of an eviction from public housing for failure to com-
ply with loyalty oath requirements. Compare reasoning of court in Peters
v. New York City Housing Authority, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 712
1954), at 714: "Furthermore, in the present day context of world crisis after
crisis, it is our opinion that the danger the Congress is seeking to avoid (i.e.,
infiltration of government housing by subversive elements) justifies the re-
quirement that tenants herein choose between government housing and mem-
bership in an organization they know to have been found subversive by the
Attorney General." Note: Reversed on Non-constitutional grounds in 307
N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954).
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found that the relator was denied due process of law under the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment because he was unable to obtain
a transcript of record for use in perfecting his appeal from the con-
viction in the original trial. The warden appealed from an order dis-
charging the prisoner from custody. Held: It was the duty of the
district court not to disturb the custody of the prisoner, but to remand
him to the state court which tried him originally with instructions to
vacate the judgment of conviction and to grant him a new trial. United
States ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1958).
Once again the court was faced with the problem of determining
the scope and application of the directive contained in the Habeas
Corpus Act1 which requires that:
The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and
dispose of the matter as law and justice require.
The above final phrase of section 2243 would seem to be susceptible
of an extremely broad construction. Speaking for the court in the case
of In Re Bonner,2 Mr. Justice Field stated in this regard:
The court is invested with the largest power to control and
direct the form of judgment to be entered in cases brought up
before it on habeas corpus.
At least it has been settled in a long line of cases that where upon habeas
corpus it is concluded that the detention is unlawful, the outcome is not
necessarily an order directing the immediate discharge of the prisoner.3
Granting such broad power in habeas corpus proceedings before
the federal courts, nevertheless, the custody of the petitioner is a
significant factor. Where the prisoner is in the custody of federal offi-
cials the courts are under no restraints in hearing the petition and
making a proper disposition of the matter. Where, however, the
prisoner is in state custody the delicate problem of federal-state rela-
tions enters the picture and additional factors must be considered. 4
128 U.S.C.A. §2243.
2151 U.S. 242 (1894).
8 See Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160 (1889); In re Bonner, supra note 2;
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Dowd v. U.S. ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206,
19 A.L.R. 2d 784 (1951).
4 See Justice Jackson concurring in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ; See
also 28 U.S.C.A. §2241 Power to Grant Writ
"(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(B) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States."
It appears that for a considerable period of time after the passage of the
Habeas Corpus Act the possibilities of federal habeas corpus to procure re-
lease from state detention were not fully appreciated.
Petitions filed in federal district courts for habeas corpus challenging state
convictions increased from one hundred twenty-seven in 1941 to five hundred
forty-one in 1952. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHio ST.
L. J. 337 (1949).
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In the present case there seems little question that the relator was
entitled to relief upon his petition for habeas corpus. The opinion of
the court by Judge Hastings and the dissent of Judge Finnegan both
concur in the finding by the district court that the state remedies had
been exhausted,5 and that the petitioner was being denied his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Therefore the only problem was the nature of the relief to be,
granted. The order of the court was as follows :ea
. . . The order of the district court releasing petitioner from
custody is reversed and this cause is ordered remanded to that
court with instructions that it remand petitioner to the Circuit
Court of Christian County, Illinois, with directions to the latter
court to vacate the judgment of conviction and to grant petition-
er, Charles Westbrook, a new trial; and that upon the failure
of the Circuit Court of Christian County, Illinois to vacate said
judgment of conviction and to grant said new trial within six
months after the date of the actual physical delivery of peti-
tioner to the custody of said circuit court, the petitioner shall
be finally discharged from custody. (Emphasis supplied.)
Read literally, such an order would seem beyond the power of the
court. Judge Finnegan states in his dissent, "I have grave doubts that
a U.S. District Court can order the Circuit Court of Christian County
to vacate this judgment of conviction." U.S. District Courts have no
supervisory power over the administration of the states' criminal law,
5Required by 28 U.S.C.A. §2254 State custody; remedies in state courts. "An
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pur-
suant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
state, or that there is either an absence of available state corrective process
or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the prisoner. An applicant shall not be deemed to have ex-
hausted the remedies available in the courts of the state, within the meaning
of this section, if he has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented."
Judge Schnackenberg, while agreeable with the desposition, pointed out in a
concurring opinion that he did not believe the prisoner had exhausted his
state remedies because of the availability of a bystander's bill of exceptions,
that is, a bill of exceptions prepared from someone's memory in condensed
or narrative form and certified by the trial judge, and therefore a dismissal
of the petition was justified. (259 F. 2d at 220.) It is submitted that this
position detracts from the persuasive value of the decision by, in effect,
leaving the case without a majority opinion.
6 While the right of appeal is not essential to due process, McKaine v. Dur-
ston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894), ILL. REv. STAT. 1955, C. 38 §769.1 provides:
"Writs of error in all criminal cases are writs of right and shall be issued of
course." Thus the inability of the petitioner to obtain a review of his con-
viction was a denial of equal protection of the laws and due process of law.
Also under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 65 it is necessary for the defendant
to furnish the appellate court with a bill of exceptions or report of proceed-
ings at the trial certified by the trial judge in order to get full direct appellate
review of alleged errors by a writ of error. ILL. REv. STAT. 1955, C. 110,
§101.65.
6a 259 F. 2d at 219.
[Vol. 42
RECENT DECISIONS
and the three cases cited in support of the decision are lacking in any
authority for such action.7
It is submitted that the order, read in conjunction with the time
limitation imposed, should be construed not as directing the state court
to vacate its judgment of conviction and grant a new trial, but merely
as allowing the state six months within which to take affirmative action
on its own motion in granting the petitioner a new trial, failing which
the prisoner was to be finally discharged from custody.
So construed the disposition is more in accord with prior decisions.
In re Medley8 the court found the petitioner was sentenced under a
state ex post facto law and therefore in custody in violation of the
United States Constitution; but was, nevertheless, guilty of a capital
offense. Disposition: The warden of the prison was ordered to notify
the attorney general of the state of the precise time when the prisoner
was to be released from custody at least ten days beforehand and then
to discharge the prisoner at that time.
The petitioner in Dowd v. U.S. ex rel Cook9 was held to have been
detained in violation of his Constitutional rights in that the warden of
the prison prevented a timely appeal of his conviction by suppressing
the appeal papers. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the dis-
trict court with instructions to that court to enter such orders as were
appropriate to allow the state a reasonable time in which to afford the
petitioner the full appellate review he would have received but for the
suppression of his papers, failing which he was to be discharged.'0
The position taken by the court in the present case, it is believed,
follows the policy which should generally prevail where the petitioner
has been convicted in a state court and the illegal detention results from
an improper sentence or a failure to provide adequate appellate re-
view; the purpose being to afford the state a reasonable time for cor-
rective action. The broad powers in federal habeas corpus must be
Mahler v. Eby, supira, note 3 and Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113 (1924) are
immigration case opinions involving rulings of federal administrative officials,
not the judgment of a state trial court. These opinions would appear to have
no application in the present situation. The third case cited was Chessman
v. Teets, 354 U.S. 166 (1957), one of a number of decisions in the much
publicized Chessnan case arising in California. Chessman was convicted of
a capital offense in the state court. The official court reporter died before
his notes were transcribed and a substitute reporter transcribed them in close
collaboration with the prosecutor. The petitioner was not represented in
person or by counsel when the trial record was settled, and such record was
used on appeal to the state supreme court. In the federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings it was held that the ex parte settlement of the record violated due
process under the 14th Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the
case with orders that the state should be allowed a reasonable time for cor-
rective action, failing which the petitioner was to be discharged. This case
also fails to provide any support for the order in question.
8 Supra note 3.
9 Supra note 3.
10 See also Chessman v. Teets, supra note 7, and O'Brien v. Lindsey, 202 F. 2d
418 (1st Cir. 1953).
1959]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
exercised in aid of the state's administration of justice, not to defeat
or needlessly embarrass it.
Under the particular facts of this case a strong argument can be
made in favor of affirming the action of the district court. The dissent
of Judge Finnegan does just that. As the record clearly shows the
petitioner filed a notice of appeal and requested a verbatim record
immediately after his conviction. Through no fault of his own he was
prevented from further prosecuting the appeal. The matter was before
the State Supreme Court on at least three separate occasions" when
action could have been taken to grant a new trial. It would seem that
during the ten year period preceding the present case the state had
already had a reasonable time in which to take corrective action and
that now law and justice would require the prisoner to be discharged.
Aside from the final disposition of the case, there is a question of
the propriety of the order of the district court discharging the prisoner
in view of the request by the state attorney general that the prisoner
be not released pending appeal. In O'Brien v. Lindsey12 the following
comment was made:
Weighing the relevant considerations of policy, it is by no
means clear that as a matter of right and routine a state prisoner
should be set at large pending review in a court of appeals of a
federal district court order discharging the prisoner on habeas
corpus.
Considering here the fact that the district judge certified that there ex-
isted probable cause for appeal" and also the attorney general's re-
quest, it would appear that the discharge should have been delayed
pending the appeal.
FRANK C. DEGUIRE
Federal Income Taxation: Depreciation Deduction-Useful Life
and Salvage Value Under the Declining Balance Method-Taxpayer
corporation is engaged in the business of renting automobiles. On
an average, during the tax years in issue, new cars were held by the
taxpayer for a period of 26 months and then sold, although, generally,
such autos had a useful life to someone of four years. Taxpayer con-
tended that it should be allowed to depreciate the cars on the declining
11 1951-Westbrook, appearing pro se, prosecuted a writ of error to the Illinois
Supreme Court, contending the sentence imposed was improper. The Court
held that the sentence was not for an indeterminate period and remanded the
the case for imposition of a proper sentence. He was resentenced to 30-50
years imprisonment. People v. Westbrook, 411 Ill. 301, 103 N.E. 2d 494 (1952).
1952-Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a denial of petition for a hearing under
the Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act, ILL. REv. STAT. 1953, C. 38, §§26-832.
1956-Petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed. See 259 F. 2d at 217.12202. F. 2d 418, 420 (1st Cir. 1953).
'3 See 28 U.S.C.A. §2253.
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